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efforts of the Department of Defense and the Navy in the
San Diego, California region. It shows that previous efforts
to reduce cost and generated waste have not been successful.
The study reveals that efforts by Fleet Industrial Supply
Center, San Diego should reduce both costs and wastes and that
the improvements in the pricing schedule used by Public Works
Center, San Diego to charge for hazardous waste processing
services also should reduce costs. The research concludes
that the best method to reduce costs is to reduce the waste
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Federal governmental intervention into the area of
environmental reaulation came to fruition with issuance of
Executive Order 11472 in May 1969, to establish the
Environmental Quality Council and the Citizen's Advisory
Committee on Environmental Quality. These two organizations
provided the nation with legislation that was enacted into law
on 1 January 1970 as the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) [42 usc 4321, 32 CFR 775]. NEPA provided the nation
with its first significant, official environmental policy.
Since then, substantial additional legislation and regulations
have been enacted to protect our environment and natural
resources.1
Although mandated by NEPA to consider environmental
effects of proposed action in their decision making process,
the Department of Defense (DoD) routinely went about its
business with widespread disregard of environmental concerns
for a considerable period of time. It was not until Executive
Order 12088 was issued in October 1978, directing the heads of
all Executive agencies to become environmentally responsible,
'Appendix A lists all acronyms used in this research.
Appendix B lists all pertinent environmental regulations.
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that DoD officials were forced to start to act in an
environmentally responsible manner. Further, flagrant
nonchalance toward federal, state and local Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by DoD prompted intense
congressional interest and intervention. This has forced the
hands of DoD officials to abide by strict fiscal and
procedural processes toward these efforts.
B. OBJECTIVE
DoD activities have increased awareness and
responsibility for environmental damage caused by years of
negligence and abuse in the handling and treatment of
hazardous and toxic waste material. Numerous proactive and
reactive responses to control, correct and establish
responsible measures to preserve and protect the environment
have been established. Unarguably, these steps were necessary
but, they have created skyrocketing costs that must be
addressed by DoD and Navy financial managers.
This thesis will examine these concerns and the efforts
that have been undertaken in the San Diego, California region
to reduce hazardous and toxic waste, and material generation
and abatement. This is a large metropolitan area with several
Naval facilities and other producers of hazardous and toxic
waste and material. As with DoD facilities, each of these




The questions addressed by this research include: What
efforts have been effected by DoD and some of its various
entities to achieve environmentally sound practices in the San
Diego, California area? To what extent have these efforts
combated the spiraling costs associated with hazardous and
toxic waste, and material management? Are there any other
means available to reduce proliferation of these materials or
the costs of disposal and treatment?
D. SCOPE
This research will provide a comprehensive assessment of
current efforts in the San Diego, California area to control
the costs associated with the generation and processing of
hazardous and toxic waste and material. It will identify the
wastes generated and associated handling costs. It also will
examine efforts and technologies that may be exploited to
further control costs.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Research and data collection will be limited to Naval
facilities in the San Diego, California area. Existing data
on the volume and types of material generated will be
collected and analyzed as will the costs incurred to process
and treat this material. Interviews with instrumental
organizations and personnel actively involved in hazardous
3
waste processing and abatement in DOD and this geographic
region will be conducted.
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter II will provide a background presentation on DOD
policy, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) actions, Public Works
Center (PWC), San Diego, California policy and actions, and
Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC), San Diego, California
actions.. The third chapter will present data and analysis for
waste streams and associated costs, hazardous material and
waste minimization efforts, and available hazardous waste
treatment technology. Chapter IV provides a summary,
conclusions, and areas for further research.
4
II. BACKGROUND
We are, according to everything that I read, in the decade
of an environment. The mission, as I see it, of the Armed
Services Committee and this panel is to try to put balance
into what we think is going to be kind of a feverish-type
project for the next decade, to move things probably a lot
faster than is possible, but the mission that we also have
is to speed things up from where they are right
now. [Ref. 1]
These words of the Honorable Richard Ray, Representative
from Georgia, Chairman, Environmental Restoration Panel of the
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Service3, spoken
in April 1990, reflect the continued interest of Congress in
DoD environmental matters that still persists today. This
chapter will lay the background of what certain entities
within this arena have undertaken to support sound
environmental practices DoD wide and in the San Diego,
California region.
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY
Military installations have long been engaged in
operations dealing with hazardous and toxic wastes, and
materials due to the very nature of their mission. These
include such things as weapons, munitions, gases, pesticides,
defoliants, fuels, lubricants, paints, and paint removers,
cleaners, degreasers, hydraulic fluids, contaminated sludge,
and acids. Many of these materials contain heavy metals,
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volatile organic solvents, and other toxic chemicals which
have been found to cause cancer, birth defects, and other
health hazards to humans and to the environment if improperly
handled, stored and disposed. [Ref. 2]
The most widely accepted and endorsed waste minimization
method is source reduction. That is, any activity that
reduces or eliminates the generation of a hazardous or toxic
waste within a process, such as industrial production, repair,
and maintenance processes. Other means also included are:
better management of hazardous materials, recycling, reuse,
and treatment of hazardous wastes to render them
inert. [Ref. 3]
Responding to the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984, which required all hazardous waste generators to have
minimization nrograms, DoD delegated responsibility for
developing and implementing such programs to the individual
Service Departments. This responsibility was again, formally
delegated to the services by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Environment) (DASD(E)) in a February 1987, policy
letter. [Ref. 3:pp. 2,11]
Responding to the delegation of responsibility to the
services that occurred in 1984, the Joint Logistics Commanders
(Commanders of the Army Materiel Command, Air Forue Logistics
and Air Force Systems Commands, and the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Logistics)) developed a minimization program to
provide the services with the basic concepts and requirements
6
of a hazardous waste minimization program. This program was
to be utilized by the services in designing programs to fit
their specific needs. The DASD(E) policy letter of 1987 drew
upon the tenets of the Joint Logistics Commanders program and
further outlined a minimization program that included:
"* Reviewing all existing technology.
"* Assessing existing technology being used at activities.
"* Accurately reporting hazardous waste.
"* Controlling hazardous waste materials.
"* Developing command reduction goals and monitoring progress
toward achieving them.
"• Establishing hazardous waste minimization as an important
consideration in all acquisitions. [Ref.3:p. 11]
1. Department of the Navy
As with DoD in general, Navy was slow to respond to
the growing interest and legislative actions associated with
environmental responsibility. Various superficial efforts
were enacted to bring about process changes, material
substitutions, and recycling but they were met with equally
superficial responses by commands and installations. These
efforts probably were doomed to fail because they lacked the
key aspects necessary for any strategy to succeed. Namely,
they did not assign clear accountability and responsibility,
and they lacked goals.
Finally, on May 18, 1988, Navy issued a formal
hazardous waste program that established roles and
7
responsibilities for major commands and activities.
Additionally, using the weight of hazardous waste generated in
1987 as a benchmark, it set a Navy wide goal to reduce
hazardous waste generated by fifty percent by the end of 1992.
Also included in this directive was a requirement that the
acquisition process for all weapons and support systems
consider hazardous waste minimization. Each major command was
directed to support this plan by:
"* Implementing the entire program at their shore activities.
"* Monitoring minimization goals.
"* Substituting less hazardous materials for presently used
hazardous materials.
"• Evaluating new processes, process changes, facilities, and
weapon systems to determine ways for minimizing the use of
hazardous materials as much as possible. [Ref. 3:p. 15]
This plan was nearly an exact replication of the DoD
program. Most major commands have enacted compliance to this
program by further delegating the responsibilities to
subordinate commands. What this has done then is caused
myriad programs throughout the Navy, major commands, and even
in the same geographic areas. There surely are commonalities
but the fact is that each command is different because the
Commanding Officer of each individual command is ultimately
responsible for signing the EPA site permit and for compliance
with all EPA regulations and infractions.
8
These efforts slowly brought about positive changes in
hazardous waste management but the pace was slow and probably
was not at an optimal level. Up to this point, the only
impetus for compliance was the threat of the base commander
receiving a notice of violation or fine for non-compliance
from EPA. Starting in 1990 however, base commanders were
tasked with financial responsibility for environmental
compliance. That is, they now had to budget for hazardous
waste management. This intensified awareness of procedural
and management deficiencies to a new level.
B. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY ACTIONS
Prior to the 1980 amendment to the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) the individual services were
responsible for final disposition of hazardous materials and
wastes. As a result of the amendment, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) shifted this responsibility to DLA.
Previously, DLA was primarily only involved in reutilization
and sales of hazardous materials. Since environmental
regu.ations were becoming more and more complicated, and were
ever increasing, this was a logical move on the part of OSD.
It basically tasked one organization to be actively involved
with the myriad factors involved with safe and economical
disposal and reutilization of hazardous wastes and
materials. [Ref. l:p. 4]
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DLA implemented their efforts through their regional
activities known as Defense Reutilization and Marketing
Service (DRMS) and through their field activities known as
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMO). On a very
simplified level, the process used by DLA is to find another
DoD activity that can reuse the material, find a buyer for the
material provided it is in satisfactory condition or dispose
of the material in an environmentally safe manner through use
of service contracts. Whether issued, sold or contracted for
ultimate disposal, hazardous wastes are only released to
agencies, individuals or commercial organizations that are
permitted by EPA to receive and handle such
property. [Ref. l:pp. 4-5]
Hazardous materials as defined by DLA are any item which
has special characteristics which could cause harm to
personnel or the environment if used or stored improperly, and
must be ultimately disposed of as hazardous waste [Ref.
l:p. 14]. If the materials cannot be placed by reutilization
within DoD, transferred to another federal agency or sold to
the public, then it is treated as hazardous waste.
Certain categories of material are prohibited from any
screening or sales cycles and are processed directly to
ultimate disposal. Some are precluded from sale by law, such
as PCBs, cancelled/suspended pesticides, and items containing
friable asbestos. Other items have no sale value, such as
spill residue, hardened paints, used items, and items in
10
leaking, rusted, or heavily dented containers. These items
are identified as "by-pass" items and are exempt from the
screening and sales cycles. [Ref. I:pp. 14-16]
Defense Logistics Agency management of hazardous materials
came under great scrutiny during the 1980's because of press
reports critical of its program to resell hazardous materials
to private parties. In a number of instances, these buyers
did not handle the hazardous materials in a responsible manner
and significant environmental damage resulted. Allegations
were made that DLA was seeking to minimize DoD's hazardous
waste disposal requirements by selling hazardous materials to
unwitting outside parties. Further, it was found by the DoD
Inspector General that DLA did not always have effective
control and visibility over the hazardous waste that had been
turned in, removed and disposed of. [Ref. l:p. 2]
The problems encountered by DLA were partly generated
through their own fault, but some other factors beyond their
control helped to exacerbate the situation. Procurement of
excessive amounts of hazardous materials by DoD activities and
their subsequent non-use before expiration of shelf life
caused too much of this material to be turned over to DLA for
resale or disposal. Additionally, it was found by the DoD
Inspector General that DoD generators do not adequately
identify waste when it is turned over to DLA for disposal.
The generators are required to complete waste profile sheets
prior to turning in their waste to DRMO for disposal. In
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cases where they have insufficient in-house knowledge to
complete the profile sheet, they are to furnish a laboratory
analysis that is available through DLA's Defense Industrial
Supply Centers. Lastly, DLA was having difficulty dealing
with qualified contractors. The biggest problem with
contractors was the unwillingness of the most qualified
contractors to bid for the service contracts because of the
known inadequacy of DoD generators regarding proper
identification of hazardous materials. [Ref. l:pp. 2-4, 23-24]
To combat these growing problems and concerns, DRMS
officials took initiatives to exercise greater control over
what is sold and to whom it is sold. They have employed the
use of annual requirements contracts that stipulate the
removal time frame for disposal to be no more than 30 days
from issuance of the disposal order. Use of interim, one-time
contracts is limited to only cover extended lapses in
negotiating new annual contracts. The contracts require the
contractors to identify in advance, transportation and any
treatment, storage and disposal facilities they will use.
DRMS evaluates contractor past-performance, proposed
subcontractors, EPA and state permits and licenses, and
proposed disposal sites for technical acceptability. The
contractor may not deviate from any aspect or clause of the
contract without approval from DRMS. Other safeguards to
ensure that hazardous wastes are disposed in an
environmentally safe manner are tracking of wastes from
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initial turn-in to ultimate disposal and the physical
inspection of contractors operations to assure they are
meeting the terms and conditions of the
contract. [Ref. l:p. 22]
An installation management directive of 1986 and its
reaffirmation by the Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1989
allows base commanders who are not satisfied with the services
provided by DRMS to contract for those services on their own.
The service received must be equivalent to those of the DRMS
contract and the parent service must be informed of intentions
to do so. Additionally, the service must be provided at a
better cost and with better quality and assurances than that
of the DRMS contract. There has been little evidence of base
commanding officers executing this option throughout the Navy
and none in the San Diego area. The following benefits of
DPRMS contract utilization provide evidence as to why the base
commanders have foregone the aforementioned option:
* 100% disposal contract support witi' no overhead charges to
the DoD components.
0 100% manifest tracking to maintain an audit trail from
initial turn-in to DRMO until final disposition.
- 100% monitoring of contractor performance at time of
pickup through the DRMO employee serving as the
Contracting Officer's Representative.
* Extensive technical evaluation of contractors prior to
contract award and monitoring during performance of
contract.
* Records of contractor performance histories maintained to
evaluate performance.
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"* Reutilization/Transfer/Donation (R/T/D) and Sale of
hazardous property and the potential to create new R/T/D
and Sales alternatives.
"* Capability to provide valuable contract cost and
management data for individual installations and DoD
components.
"* Contracts are streamlined with standard contract
provisions to ensure compliance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulations and Federal, state, and local
environmental regulations.
"* Reduced contract costs because of geographic
considerations and special contract designs.
"* Contract requirements tailored to meet the customers'
needs. [Ref. l:p. 83]
The above benefits probably could not be achieved by any one
installation due to economies of scale obtained through DRMS,
and because most installations do not have the expertise and
manpower necessary to execute such a program properly.
C. NAVY PUBLIC WORKS CENTER, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
PWC San Diego has played a key role in the evolutionary
process of hazardous waste management in the San Diego area.
They serve as a middle man between generators and DRMO
regarding transportation of hazardous material between these
two activities and they serve as the primary receiver,
consolidator, storage facility, and ultimate disposer of
hazardous wastes generated by Naval activities in this
geographic area. The emphasis in this section will be placed
on the function of PWC regarding hazardous waste rather than
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their role as a transporter of hazardous material to DRMO for
reutilization or sale. 2
Facilities operated by PWC include two Treatment, Disposal
and Storage Facilities (TDSF) and three satellite facilities.
The TDSFs are located at Naval Air Station North Island
(NASNI) and Naval Station San Diego (NAVSTA). Satellite
facilities are located at Naval Air Station Miramar, Naval Air
Facility El Centro, and Naval Submarine Base San Diego. The
TDSFs are permitted by EPA to store hazardous waste for up to
one year from the initial generation date and the satellite
facilities are permitted by EPA to store hazardous waste for
up to 90 days from the initial generation date. It should be
noted that the TDSFs operated by PWC are only permitted to
store and dispose of hazardous materials; they have not been
permitted to treat this material in order to render it inert.
Generators have not been freed from their environmental
responsibility because of PWC interaction but it has been
lessened to a considerable extent. The generators are
responsible for the proper labeling, completion of the profile
sheet, and any laboratory analysis needed for identification
of unknown wastes prior to loading on the PWC vehicle. PWC
does not have a sufficient level of in-house knowledge and
funding to provide this service at each local activity. Once
the waste is accepted by the PWC representative, the
2Information in this section is a result of interviews with
PWC San Diego personnel and personal observation.
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responsibility and reliability for safe handling and storage
transfers to them. At this point, PWC will make the
appropriate determination regarding consolidation, storage,
and ultimate disposal of the waste material.
Upon proper determination of which facility the waste
should be transported to, PWC again reviews the associated
paper work and processes the material according to EPA
regulations. Storage, consolidation with previously collected
wastes, or disposal to the DRMS contracted treatment and
disposal facility is effected at this time.
Like DLA and its regional and field activities, PWC has
been highly criticized for the exorbitant prices it charges
customers. Because of their role as primary receiver of this
waste in the San Diego area, they, rather than DLA, have been
the center of focus for the Comptroller of both Commander,
Naval Air Force, Pacific (CNAP), and Commander, Naval Surface
Force, Pacific (CNSP). This is understandable because the
generators are charged for waste disposal services through PWC
rather than DLA or DRMO.
The rates charged by PWC are not a mere reflection of the
rates established by the DRMS contract. They must capture the
contracted rates and additionally, overhead must be allocated
to cover PWC internal costs for labor, material and equipment.
These are hidden costs to the generators utilizing the PWC
service but they are costs that they would have to budget and
absorb if they were to perform this function internally. [To
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date, only Naval Amphibious Base Coronado has attempted to
avoid the PWC rates by operating directly with DRMO and the
contracted hazardous waste disposer. According to PWC, NAB
has had limited success and is considering reverting to the
use of the PWC service.]
Prior to Fiscal Year (FY) 1993, PWC used one flat rate for
all wastes turned-in by generators. This created complaints
because the flat rate was erroneous, misapplied, and actually
resulted in profitable operations for PWC. For example, if an
activity turned-in a 55 gallon drum of oily rags, PWC charged
for a full drum even if the drum was only partially full.
This flat fee could not have possibly been a fair rate
because the DRMS contracts generally cite 30 to 40 different
fees based on waste types. Even the most astute analyst using
sophisticated regression programming could not derive a fair
price allocation using a flat fee formula. There are too many
variable factors involved in the pricing equation and the
waste stream data from previous years had been highly variable
and unreliable as well.
PWC exhibited sensitivity to their customers complaints
and has made earnest efforts to rectify the pricing
inequities. Their first attempt at being more responsive came
in FY 93 when they switched from the single volume rate to
three rate structures based on actual poundage. This
structure is reflected in Table 1. This has increased
customer satisfaction because they now know exactly what and
17
how much waste they have turned-in and how much they will be
charged for it.
TABLE 1
PWC HAZARDOUS WASTE SERVICE CHARGES
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993
WASTE COST PER POUND
Inorganic $3.00
Organic $2.50
Special 3  $2.00
Although this pricing structure was received well by the
customers of PWC, PWC has continued their commitment to
providing quality service at a fair and reasonable price. A
review conducted during 1993 has led to a further expanded
structure for FY 94. As reflected in Table 2, there are now
sixteen different categories of waste and PWC predicts that
there will be a 15% to 25% decrease in costs to the
generators. This is possible because of the broader base of
wastes used for structuring and because the structure also
takes into account the size of container turned-in. PWC again
attempted to capture the true overhead costs associated with
each waste stream.
3Special substances are wastes that could not be identified,
are unusual, or the mixture does not fit the routine of an
inorganic or organic substance.
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TABLE 2
PKC HAZARDOUS WASTE SERVICE CHARGES
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994
WASTE COST PER POUND
Ignitable 1-5 G. $2.25
Corrosive 1-5 G. $1.35
Toxicity, Container/Bags $2.00
Ignitable 55 G. $1.90
Corrosive 55 G. $1.00
Reactive Waste $3.75
Plating Waste $2.85
Toxicity 55 G. $1.75
Solvent Liquid 1-5 G. $1.35
Solvent Liquid 55 G. $1.05
Solvent Solid 1-5 G. $2.50
Solvent Solid 55 G. $2.00
Oil 1-5 G. $1.00
Oil 55 G. Uncontaminated $0.50
Oil 55 G. Contaminated $1.50
PCB $2.20
D. FLEET INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
FISC San Diego actively entered hazardous material
management during 1993 with implementation of hazardous
material reuse stores located at NASNI and NAVSTA. These
stores operate in a unique manner and promise a potentially
tremendous cost savings to the Navy regarding both procurement
and disposal fees. Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
19
funds this prototype program even though no direct benefits
accrue to the FISC. The founding principle of the stores is
based on the belief that the greatest potential for savings in
the cost of hazardous waste disposal is to reduce the waste
stream. 4
The reuse store provides an alternative outlet to DRMO for
activities in possession of hazardous material that is held in
excess to their needs or is no longer needed. Unlike DRMO,
the stores will accept material that is in rusted, dented or
poorly labeled containers provided that it is in serviceable
condition and can be properly identified. The generators can
turn this material over to the store without any associated
paper work. Turning the material in requires little more than
making a telephone call to the store to inform them that it is
available.
Upon receipt of material, store personnel inspect,
catalogue, and store material on shelves or pallets. When the
program was first initiated, some of the material received was
actually hazardous waste due to expired shelf lives and
various other reasons. The majority of the material received
was in serviceable condition and thus enabled a successful
initiation. Listings of available material are made available
to the San Diego area customer base. Customers can review the
4Information in this section was obtained from a personal
interview with FISC San Diego personnel and from personal
observation of the Hazardous Material Reuse Store located at
NAVSTA.
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listing to identify any hazardous material needed by their
command and obtain it free of charge. To draw the material
they only need to make a telephone call to the appropriate
store holding the material and it will be delivered Lo them by
store personnel.
To further promote efficiency and economy, FISC queried
customers for all hazardous material used in routine
operations. This material is being added to the stores so
that it too will be available for customers use and therefore
provide a dis-incentive to requisitioning and stocking in the
normal manner. Again, the same requisitioning procedures
apply to this 'A' condition material as apply to the material
turned in because of an excess condition. This material is
not free-issue per se but the accounting for its cost is
invisible to the customers. FISC simply informs the
applicable comptroller of the requesting activity of any
applicable charges and is then reimbursed.
Initial feedback from customers and personal observation
indicate that this program will be a success. It has some
flaws, such as lacking cradle-to-grave accountability over
material once it is reissued, but, overall, it appears to be
soundly founded and managed. More detail on projected
reductions and savings is presented in Chapter III.
The efforts of FISC regarding hazardous material
management do not stop with establishment of the reuse
21
centers. They have taken a proactive approach and intend to
or are currently providing a number of other services such as:
"* Conduct region-wide waste stream analysis.
"* Establish shop towel/rag recycling contracts.
"* Provide assistance with shelf life management.
"* Conduct reviews to identify less hazardous substitute
materials.
"* Implement paint repackaging/reformulation services.
Continued commitment by FISC and NAVSUP in endeavors such as
these promise further reduction of the hazardous waste stream
and associated disposal costs.
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III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
Environmental awareness among DoD and Navy officials in
the San Diego, California region, appears to have risen in the
past few years. On-going actions demonstrate commitment to
bring about positive changes to the way in which business is
conducted. This chapter will examine the waste streams and
associated costs generated in San Diego. It will analyze the
minimization efforts and projected effects, and address
hazardous waste treatment and/or abatement technology.
A. WASTE STREAMS AND ASSOCIATED COSTS
In-depth analysis of the waste stream is virtually
precluded at this time due to deficiencies in reporting
procedures. These procedures are complicated and often not
clear to the personnel tasked with reporting. Efforts have
been implemented by Naval Facilities Engineering Command to
simplify these procedures commencing in FY 94; these efforts
should enable collected data to properly represent hazardous
waste generation and disposal data in the future.
Chart 1 in Appendix C reports hazardous waste collection
data from selected San Diego activities and demonstrates some
of the reporting inequities. Examination of these data
reveals that some commands report material disposed, yet they
report no disposal costs. Others report disposal costs, but
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no material disposed, while other commands report what appear
to be conflicting data between the tons of material disposed
and disposal costs. Unreliability of this nature was found
throughout the Hazardous Waste Summary Reports provided by
Naval Facilities Engineering Support Command, Port Hueneme,
California.
FISC San Diego utilized locally collected data from PWC
and generated a general breakdown of the most common hazardous
waste streams generated by several larger commands in the
San Diego area (NAVSTA, NASNI, NAS Miramar, and Subase).
Figure 1 displays the results of this analysis. This material
accounts for over 1500 tons, or greater than 60% of the
hazardous waste generated and turned in to PWC during 1992 by
these activities. All of
this material is of such a WASTE STREAM BREAKDOWN
nature that it can be
recycled, reformulated, sold, 5 1 , 1 11.... ,Z3
or treated.
Figure 2 provides the
waste stream generation data 1 ........
of the same commands utilized
in Figure 1 for CY 88 to 93.
By 1992, the waste stream 59S 50 D CA
generated has clearly more Figure 1
than doubled over that which was generated in 1988. This is
an alarming trend and clearly is in violation of the mandate
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to reduce generation levels by 50%.1 There are a number of
possible reasons why this trend has occurred. The most
logical of which is the changing scenario in the post cold war
era.
0f1 A Q'E C T M' A N
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Source. FiSC San Diego and PVC San Diego
Figure 2
The end of the Soviet Union threat to United States
interests has caused a massive rethinking regarding national
strategy. This shift in strategy calls for a down-sized
5Data presented in Appendix C and data in Figures 1 and 2 is
not the same because selected activities were used in both cases.
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military in both personnel, facilities and equipment. Navy
vessels have been decommissioned in the San Diego area in
support of these efforts. Actions of this nature result in
generation of increased hazardous waste streams that otherwise
would not have been generated in such great magnitude.
Another contributing factor to this growth is perhaps
related to the increased interest in hazardous waste
minimization and compliance efforts by installation commanding
officers. Much of this interest is attributable to DoD and
Navy policy and to increased regulatory pressure from local,
regional and state governments. Efforts to minimize the risk
of non-compliance may in effect increase the elimination of
unwanted and expired stores, thereby increasing waste
generation. Additionally, personnel involved with hazardous
waste handling may be treating certain non-hazardous wastes as
hazardous wastes to further safeguard the installation and the
commander from an EPA violation. An example of this is
disposing of an empty paint can with hardened residue as waste
rather than as trash.
Appendix C, Chart 2, presents selected accounting data
from CNAP and CNSP activities in the San Diego area for
environmental expenditures. Appendix D provides a brief
description of the uses for the applicable sub-accounting
groups (SAG) within the accounting group (AG). Examination of
these data indicates that expenditures for shore environmental
protection have decreased over the last three fiscal years.
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This is not a good trend because it is these funds that could
be used for implementation of various endeavors to further
reduce long term hazardous waste costs. An example of this is
an environmental impact study associated with the application
and permitting process needed to implement waste treatment
technology. These funds also could be utilized to improve
existing facilities so as to lessen the risk associated with
improper handling, storage, and processing of the wastes.
Currently, only class 1 and 2 projects are funded because they
are the most critical and would result in a fine if not
corrected. Appendix E provides a description of project
classifications.
As may be expected, expenditures for disposal and other
non-disposal hazardous waste operations have increased
significantly because of the increase in waste generation and
disposal. The increase in this SAG directly impacts the
ability to funnel funds into protective measures. As long as
disposal generation is on the rise, this phenomenon will not
abate. More funds must be allocated through the budget
process to adequately fund shortfalls in environmental
protection expenditures.
B. HAZARDOUS MATERIAL AND WASTE MINIMIZATION
As discussed in the previous section, the generation of
hazardous waste has actually risen vice declined due to a
possible myriad assortment of reasons. Current efforts by
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FISC to combat and minimize this problem project potential
cost savings and reduction of waste. These efforts will be
bolstered further by the efforts of individual commands to
establish proper requisitioning and control procedures.
Clearly though, the efforts of FISC promise the most
widespread effect in these endeavors. The projected savings
as determined by FISC are presented below.
PROJECTED SAVINGS OF FISC SAN DIEGO
HAZARDOUS WASTE MINIMIZATION PROGRAM
(000's)
FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99
Reutilization $1,000 $1,300 $1,300 $1,300 $1,300
Inventory Inv. 500 400 100 0 0
Waste Reduction 2,000 6,000 7,000 7,000 8,000
Shelf Life 300 300 300 300 300
Personnel 350 350 500 500 500
Recycling 250 250 250 250 250
Regulatory Comp. 250 400 400 400 400
Subtotal $4,650 $9,000 $9,850 $9,750 $10,750
Cost 1,250 1,500 1,750 1,750 1,750
Total Savings $3.400 $7,50U S8.100 S8.000 S900
Definitions of the above programs are as follows:
"* Reutilization: Savings associated with Re-use Store
operations (cost avoidance for free issue material and
disposal cost avoidance).
"* Inventory Investment: Reduction of stock funded
inventories in area.
"* Waste Reduction: Reduced area hazardous waste disposal
costs due to hazardous material program initiatives.
"• Shelf Life: Waste disposal cost reductions associated
with area shelf life management.
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"* Personnel: Savings associated with consolidated hazardous
material management versus stovepipe operations (military
and civilian costs).
"* Recycling: Savings generated through implementation of
regional consolidated projects.
"* Regulatory Compliance: Savings on potential fines to base
activities resulting from comprehensive hazardous material
management.6
Not all of the savings projected by FISC will be a direct
reduction to the hazardous waste accounting group account of
the area comptrollers, but a significant portion of those
savings will be shared by all. The net savings in the entire
region are substantial and should allow for increased spending
in the shore environmental protection sub-accounting group
(SAG FX). This in turn should realize increased savings and
a safer working environment.
The implementation cost incurred by FISC for establishing
this program was $1.2 million. The projected $36 million
savings (FY 95 to FY 99) indicate a good potential for long
term savings thereby making this a fruitful investment.
Commitment and cooperation between all parties should ensure
a successful project that produces a substantial cost savings
and helps to ensure regulatory compliance.
6Source: FISC briefing paper on "San Diego Regional Hazmat
Program Cost/Savings Analysis".
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C. IWSTE TREATKENT TECHNOLOGY
Regulatory uncertainty discourages private investment in
regional waste treatment centers that could render most
hazardous wastes generated in the region inert,
nonleachable and nonhazardous. Typical investment
required for a regional treatment facility using Fujibeton
technology is in the range of $750,000 to $1,500,000.
This facility could render nonhazardous virtually all
inorganic waste and most organic waste. [Ref. 4:p.64]
The above statement of Jefferey 'iewton, President, New
Materials Technology Corporation, before a hearing of the
House of Representatives on hazardous waste treatment
technology was echoed by virtually every person testifying
before the Committee on Science and Technology. Costs cited
cannot be verified since the statement was made in 1985 and
there have been many changes in environmental regulation and
also in costs due to inflation. His remarks do have merit,
however, and they point to perhaps one of the biggest
deficiencies within the federal government, DoD, and the Navy.
That deficiency is the lack of investment in exploring,
developing and using currently existing advanced waste
treatment technologies to reduce the cost of hazardous waste
disposal by treating hazardous waste in-house.
In the past, this area was off limits to DoD and the Navy
for several reasons, the most prominent of which are: federal
regulations that forbid joint ventures between the government
and private industry where industry will benefit unfairly
because of government investment; lack of financial resources
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in the DoD budget; prohibitive EPA regulations. The last two
reasons are still valid today, but it appears that they must
change to meet the requirements of Executive Order 12856,
enacted by President William J. Clinton on August 3, 1993.
The subject of this Executive Order is "Federal Compliance
With Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention
Requirements".
Whereas, the Federal Government should Become a leader in
the field of pollution prevention through the management
of its facilities, its acquisition practices, and in
supporting the development of innovative pollution
prevention programs and technologies; ...
Whereas, as the largest single consumer in the Nation, the
Federal Government has the opportunity to realize
significant economic as well as environmental benefits of
pollution prevention; ...
Help encourage markets for clean technologies and safe
alternatives to extremely hazardous substances or toxic
chemicals through revisions to specifications and
standards, the acquisition and procurement process, and
the testing of innovative pollution prevention
technologies at Federal facilities or in acquisitions;
-Executive Order 12856
It appears that federal regulations barring joint ventures
between government and industry regarding development of
pollution treatment and abatement technologies must now be
changed. This alone will not suffice. Proper funding must
also be budgeted through the DoD/DoN budgeting system to allow
for this type of venture. DoD and the Navy must aggressively
plan and pursue funding for these actions and Congress must be
attentive to their needs. In the past, this has not been the
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case on either part. For example, the proposed Naval
Facilities Engineering Command FY 94 Shore Based Environmental
Research and Development Program is currently obsolete due to
budget cuts. This plan was aggressive in nature and would
have funded numerous projects in the fields of pollution
prevention and treatment. Had financial constraints not
curtailed these endeavors, technologies of benefit to the
Navy, DoD, and industry might have otherwise been experimented
with and adopted. These benefits would equate to a possible
cost savings and an improved environment.
The amount of technology currently in existence but not
utilized is substantial. The San Diego area is home to many
Navy and DoD installations, many of which perform industrial
type activities that produce vast quantities of hazardous
waste. These facilities are prime proving and testing grounds
for developed and experimental technology. Not all will pan
out, but certainly there is existing or emerging technology
that will effectively combat the escalating costs of hazardous
waste treatment and disposal. With proper funding for
research and development and the appropriate change in EPA
regulations, these technologies can be developed for the




The initiatives of the Joint Logistics Commanders in 1986
mark the beginning of top management commitment within DoD to
the issue of pollution abatement and control. Navy officials
later adopted this goal and have instilled it throughout all
their commands. Naval installations and commands in the
San Diego area are proactively implementing measures necessary
to promote a safe and clean environment. Their efforts
indicate potential cost savings, efficiencies, and a safer
environment. These actions alone are not enough; more can and
must be done locally and within DoD and the Navy.
FISC's hazardous waste minimization program and re-use
stores promote environmentally sound practices in both use and
procurement of hazardous materials. This program projects a
great potential cost savings that will be shared by all area
commands. If the projected savings prove to be true, they
should help to curb the spiraling costs incurred by financial
managers on environmental spending. Success of the program is
dependent on judicious use of hazardous materials; that is,
costs will be reduced the greatest if hazardous material use
is lessened through more economical use or by substitution of
a less or nonhazardous substitute.
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Efforts within DoD and the Navy to identify less hazardous
or nonhazardous substitutes must be a top priority. The Navy
system commands have been tasked to initiate this endeavor
but, there have been relatively few gains in this area. These
commands are responsible for generation of maintenance
requirement standards and specification of materials needed
for its accomplishment. Personnel involved with actual
performance of the maintenance may be the best source to
initiate investigative action to identify possible substitutes
and, therefore, should be solicited and encouraged to provide
feedback to the system commands regarding this matter.
Greater emphasis must be placed on the training of all
personnel in the safe and proper use of hazardous materials.
Proper training will ensure economical use and safe handling
of these materials, thereby allowing cost savings from the
minimized use of the material and by avoiding potential
accidents and spills that result in costly clean-up effcrts.
This training should be conducted up front in the accession
programs for military and civilian personnel.
Exploitation and use of better technology to render
hazardous waste inert must be investigated and implemented
when possible. Establishment of an all purpose single
hazardous waste treatment facility in San Diego is probably
not economically or politically feasible at present but,
limited treatment technologies may be viable at existing
facilities in the San Diego region. Technologies such as
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fujibeton, an advanced form of cement powder that is blended
with toxic materials to render them inert, merit consideration
for use. This type of technology could significantly reduce
the spiraling disposal costs incurred by financial managers
today. [Ref. 4:p. 63]
Some other technologies are super critical water
oxidation, incineration, chemical treatment, conversion of
hazardous waste to alternative energy sources, development of
high efficiency spray equipment for application of low
volatile organic compound coatings, development of alternative
paint technologies, and development of recycling technology
for abrasive blasting materials. These technologies should be
pursued if DoD and the Navy hope to reduce hazardous waste
disposal costs in an effective and efficient manner.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Compliance with environmental regulations is necessary and
costly. Realization of cost savings in this area is not easy,
but can be achieved through active participation by all
commands, support activities, and personnel at all levels.
There is no outside entity to rely on for a quick fix or easy
answer; the Navy and DoD must look inward and take the
necessary steps to make environmentally and economically sound
decisions.
Further research may be considered in the following areas:
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"* Use linear regression to analyze the cost drivers incurred
by PWC in dealing with hazardous waste management to
enhance the existing hazardous waste disposal pricing
structure.
"* Identify specific existing sites in the San Diego area,
hazardous waste treatment technologies that could be
utilized at these facilities, and the costs associated
with these technologies. NASNI or NAVSTA appear to have
the most potential for this type of endeavor.
C. SUWMRY
There are no absolutes in dealing with the environment;
however, environmental pollution is caused by a waste.
Therefore, the most environmentally sound decision is to not
create the waste in the first place. Waste treatment and
management is inherently inefficient and costly. To minimize
costs, waste must be prevented rather than controlled.
Prevention needs to be accomplished through tough management
and minimization programs, through education and training,
through use of less or non-hazardous substitutes, and through






CAA Clean Air Act
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act
CFCs Chlorofluoroncarbons
CNAP Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific
CNSP Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific
CWA Clean Water Act
DASD(E) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Environment)
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DRMO Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
DRMS Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act
FISC Fleet Industrial Supply Center
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NASNI Naval Air Station North Island
NAVSTA Naval Station San Diego
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
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PCB Polychlorinated biphenyls
PWC Public Works Center
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SAG Sub-accounting Group
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SIP State Implementation Plan
TDSF Treatment, Disposal and Storage Facility
TSCA Toxic Substance Control Act
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APPENDIX B
* Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 as amended through 1977-
requires prevention or control and abatement of air
pollution from stationary and mobile sources; requires EPA
to set binding National Ambient Air Quality Standards(NAAQS). Air quality standards are achieved by the states
through plans (State Implementation Plans - SIP's), they
are tailored to meet the needs of the different air
quality control regions. Navy installations are subject
to federal, state, and local air pollution control
requirements. [Ref. 5]
* Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972, as amended through 1987-
regulates discharge of pollutants into waters of the
United States from any point source including industrial
facilities and sewage treatment facilities; requires
permits for discharges; requires reporting and clean-up of
oil and hazardous substance spills in waterways; also
protects waterways and requires a permit to adversely
affect wetlands. The Navy has a more stringent policy
requiring no-net-loss of wetlands, meaning wetlands must
be created to replace any which are destroyed, whether by
filling or draining. [Ref. 5]
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended
through 1986- regulates waste handling activities and the
generation, transport, treatment, storage and disposal of
hazardous wastes; allows the EPA to take action against
persons conducting past or present activities that present
an imminent or substantial endangerment to health or to
the environment; provides for corrective actions against
contamination resulting from past releases of hazardous
wastes even without an imminent hazard; mandates all
branches of the federal government to comply with solid
waste and hazardous waste requirements. [Ref. 6:p. 192]
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976- empowers EPA
to collect information and regulate toxic chemicals at any
stage from manufacture through disposal; regulates
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), chlorofluoroncarbons
(CFCs), and asbestos as well as others; requires testing
of chemical substances entering the environment,
regulating releases where necessary. Allows EPA to
prohibit manufacture, limit production, ban or control the
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use of toxic chemicals to protect public health. TSCA
authority may not be delegated to states. [Ref. 5]
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)- authorizes the federal government
to clean up toxic or hazardous contaminants at closed and
abandoned hazardous waste dumps; permits the government to
recover the cost of the cleanup and associated damages by
suing the responsible parties involved; allows additional
cleanup funds to be drawn from a "superfund" created by
taxes on chemicals and hazardous wastes; places liability
for the costs of containment, removal, remedial action and
response, and for injury damages to natural resources on
the parties who operate the vessel or facility when there
is a release of a hazardous substance. [Ref. 6:p. 194)
"* Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)-
amends CERCLA and provides mandatory schedules for the
completion of various phases of remedial response
activities; established detailed cleanup standards and
strengthened existing authority to effect the cleanup of
superfund sites. [Ref. 6:p. 195]
"* Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974- regulates drinking
water quality for pollutants that may have an adverse
effect on human health or negatively effect the aesthetic
quality of drinking water. Protects underground sources
of water by regulating the underground injection of wastes
and requires states to have plans to protect well field
areas from contaminants. [Ref. 5]
"* Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) of 1972- requires the licensing or registration of
pesticide products; requires proper management of
pesticide use, storage, and disposal. [Ref. 5]
"* Endangered Species Act of 1973 as amended- requires that
actions of Federal agencies do not jeopardize the
existence of threatened or endangered species or destroy
or adversely impact critical habitats of these
species. [Ref. 5]
"* Sikes Act- requires military installations to manage their
national resources and provide public access for natural
resource use that is consistent with the military
mission. [Ref. 5]
"* Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986- provides local governments information concerning
possible chemical hazards in the community; requires
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emergency planning for releases of extremely hazardous
substances. [Ref. 5]
Executive Order 12088- link between Federal environmental
regulations and Federal facilities; requires Federal
facilities leadership in furthering the purpose and
policies and monitoring of environmental pollution in
compliance with Federal environmental regulations (signed




There are two sets of data:
1. HAZARDOUS WASTE COLLECTION DATA FROM SELECTED SAN DIEGO
ACTIVITIES.
2. FY 91-93 ACCOUNTING GROUP E4 EXPENDITURES.
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HAZARDOUS WASTE COLLECTION DATA FROM SELECTED SAN DIEGO ACTIVITIES
TONS DISPOSAL
UIC ACTIVITY DISPOSED COSTS
N00244 FISC SAN DIEGO CA 5.81 $42,059
N00245 NAVSTA SAN DIEGO CA 470.98 52,000
N00246 NAS NORTH IS SAN DIEGO CA 351.19 870,230
N00247 NTC SAN DIEGO CA 12.74 38,000
N00259 NAVAL HOSPITAL SAN DIEGO CA 10.03 13219
N00948 FLEASWTRACENPAC SAN DIEGO CA 0.00 7,600
N60042 NAF EL CENTRO CA 160.00 33239
N61665 FLECOMBATRACENPAC SAN DIEGO CA 0.00 627
N61690 FLETRACEN SAN DIEGO CA 29.08 0
N6WM59 NAS MIRAMAR CA 6.00 673,000
N62021 NAB CORONADO CA 2.00 397,000
N63387 PWC SAN DIEGO CA 418.12 0
N63406 SUBASE SAN DIEGO CA 314.64 21,000
N65584 NAV.EXW,'SYiIGCEN SAN DIEGO CA 3.78 5,800
N65888 NAVANVDEPOT NASNI SAN DIEGO CA 686.71 757,214
N65918 SIMA SAN DEG CA 39.84 64,995
N66001 NAVOCEANSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA 32.64 128,628
W0240 NAVCOMMSTA SAN DIEGO CA 0.00 5,606
CY0 TIOTAL 2543.56 $3,110,219
N00246 NAS NORTH IS SAN DIEGO CA 461.9 1,340,000
N00247 NTC SAN DIEGO CA 1624 46,728
N00259 NAVAL HOSPITAL SAN DIEGO CA 3.1 28,009
N00946 FLEASWTRACENPAC SAN DIEGO CA 2.09 12,440
N60042 NAF ELCENTRO CA 73 124,177
N61665 FLECOMBATRACENPAC SAN DIEGO CA 0 1230
N61690 FLETRPCEN SAN DIEGO CA 33.93 0
N60259 NAS LIRAMAR CA 342 607,686
N62791 SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO CA 3.95 7,330
N6338 PWC SAN DIEGO CA 924.11 4,242,000
N63406 SUBASE SAN DIEGO CA 259.08 680,104
N65584 NAVELE(SYSEGCEN SAN DIEGO CA 7.87 8,000
N6588 NAVANVDEPOT NASNI SAN DIEGO CA 562.75 1,238,735
N65918 SIMA SAN DIEGO CA 110.86 59,863
N66001 NAVOCEANSEN SAN DIEGO CA 2325 238,900
N70240 NAVCOMMSTA SAN DIEGO CA 0 6,000
CY91 TOTAL 2824.13 8,641,202
N00245 NAVSTA SAN DIEGO CA 1019.37 2,245,916
N00246 NAS NORTH IS SAN DIEGO CA 343.92 1,390,000
N00247 NTC SAN DIEGO CA 41265 56,728
N00259 NAVAL HOSPITAL SAN DIEGO CA 5.74 20,780
N39233 NEX NAVSTA SAN DIEGO CA 14.96 0
N60042 NAF EL CTROCA 163 128,492
N61665 FLECOMBATRACENPAC SAN DIEGO CA 2.42 5,800
N61690 FLETRACEN SAN DIEGO CA 44.44 0
N60259 NAS MIRAMAR CA 393 1,408,094
N62791 SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO CA 2.88 11,942
N63387 PWC SAN DIEGO CA 234.66 5,293,686
N63406 SUBASE SAN DIEGO CA 102.17 750,772
N65888 NAVANVDEPCT NASNI SAN DIEGO CA 461.94 1,790,904
N65918 SIMA SAN DIEGO CA 134.47 190,000
N66001 NAVOCEANSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA 106.64 446,000
N68944 NISE WEST SAN DIEGO CA 1.56 9,500
CY92 TOTAL 3443.82_ $13,748,614
FY 91-93 ACCOUNTING GROUP E4 EXPENDITURES
SAG FT:
ACTIVITY FY 91 FY 92 FY93 TOTAL
NAS NORTH ISLAND $1,398,241 $1,312,372 $1,030,000 $3,740,613
CNAP 179,933 310,331 1,473,000 1,963,264
NAF EL CENTRO 149,891 112,732 656,000 918,623
NAS MIRAMAR 1,227,104 2,169,627 2,685,000 6,081,731
NS SAN DIEGO 1,326,000 564,000 1,177,000 3,067,000
NAB CORONADO 575,000 838,000 451,000 1,864,000
SIMA SAN DIEGO 190,000 220,000 554,000 964,000
OPFORCES SHIPS 2,733,000 6,661,000 8,071,000 17,465,000
TOTAL $7,779,169 $12,188,062 $16,097,000 $36.064,231
SAG FX:
ACTIVITY
NAS NORTH ISLAND $1,171,113 $1,187,590 $1,796,000 $4,154,703
CNAP 0 0 60,000 60,000
NAF EL CENTRO 0 29,733 133,000 162,733
NAS MIRAMAR 1,795,943 571,622 1,234,000 3,601,565
NS SAN DIEGO 308,000 371,000 527,000 1,206,000
NAB CORONADO 1,048,000 328,000 440,000 1,816,000
SIMA SAN DIEGO 0 0 32 32
OPFORCES SHIPS 0 0 0 0
TOTAL $4,323,056 $2,487,945 $4,190,032 $11,001,033
AG E4 GRAND TOTAL $12,102,225 $.14.676,007 $20,287,032 $47,065,264
APPENDIX D
AG/SAG E4FT: HAZARDOUS WASTE
Provides for:
* Hazardous Waste Disposal
* Other Non-disposal Hazardous Operations
Includes:







"• Training of personnel that handle hazardous waste
"* Development of contingency plans
"* Hazardous waste management
"* Operation of facilities for storage, treatment or disposal
of hazardous waste
AG/SAG E4FX: SHORE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Provides for:





"* Engineering Studies (including NEPA documentation)
"* Minor alterations to facilities and equipment not
centrally funded
Does not include:
* Routine costs associated with utility operations and





la Projects needed to support signed
compliance agreement or to correct
conditions for which a facility has been
cited by government, agency, etcetera.
lb Projects required to correct noncompliant
conditions identified by the facility or
internal Navy or DoD review or audit.
2a Projects for facilities which do not meet
established standards, but compliance
deadline is in the future.
2b Projects for facilities where there is a
pending standard that cannot be met and
the compliance deadline is in the future.
3a Facility meets established standard but
needs replacement because of obsolescence.
3b Facility meets established standard but
needs expansion or will go out of
compliance.
3c Facility meets established standard but
project is needed for other than
compliance reasons. Will demonstrate
leadership.
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